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Reacting to the April 17 announcement by the Clinton 
Administration that it was going ahead with the transfer of $368 
million worth of military equipment to Pakistan, India's External 
Affairs Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee warned that a new arms race 
was "inevitable" in South Asia. From the Indian standpoint, 
Pakistan's acquisition of P-3C Orion aircraft provides it with a 
force multiplier to which India must respond. While India may seek 
a conventional response, it already has the means to raise the 
stakes: the short-range Prithvi missile, which it has delayed
deploying. This in turn would invite a Pakistani reaction in kind, 
probably with the aid of Chinese munificence. Given the intensity 
of mutually hostile perceptions over the Kashmir imbroglio, the 
shadow of nuclearization looms in the distance. Might this portend 
a new phase of South Asian instability or, worse, tragedy?
Nonproliferationists are inclined to be pessimistic. But there is 
a strong case for the view that, whatever the immediate pressures, 
strategic relations between India and Pakistan will remain 
relatively stable in years to come. In the first place, it is very 
unlikely that they will "go nuclear"; in the second, should they 
feel constrained to deploy nuclear weapons, it is still extremely 
unlikely that the relationship will be an unstable one.
A decision by one or the other to assemble and deploy nuclear 
weapons would have to be based on the assumption that, in doing 
so, there is more to be gained than lost. Since the gain can only 
be the security of deterrence, it is questionable whether any 
significant advantage would accrue from weaponization when both 
countries quite evidently perceive that nuclear deterrence already 
exists without the deployment of nuclear weapons. Pakistani 
leaders have publicly said as much. Their Indian counterparts, 
more circumspect in public, acknowledge it in private. Although 
some analysts have raised doubts about the technical capacity of 
either to deploy wepons without testing, the reality is that each 
is aware that the other has a nuclear weapons program and, in the 
absence of certain knowledge to the contrary, assumes weapons 
capabilty on the part of the other. Each, moreover, know that the 
other assumes as such. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, 
made this clear in an interview with the Japanese daily Asahi 
Shimbun last January when she asserted that her country's "nuclear 
ambiguity" has effectively deterred India. The Kashmir "crisis" of 
1990, when Pakistan is believed to have first signalled a possible 
nuclear response to a perceived conventional threat from India, is 
still shrouded in mystery. But it is clear that, since then, both . 
sides believe that their strategic relationship has shifted from a 
purely conventional one to one that is marked by the qualitatively 
different politics of nuclear weapons. That being the case, what 
is there to be gained by overt weaponization?
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Weapons deployment would invite negative external reaction to a 
degree that is unclear but which would have serious domestic 
repercussions It would for instance bring into effect the US 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1994 which mandates strong 
economic sanctions against a weaponizing country The US would 
oppose lending from the World Bank and other international 
institutions Foreign direct investment may be retarded 
significantly Both India and Pakistan would be severely impeded 
m  their economic growth efforts by the reining m  of American 
(and probably others ) investment and technology Sanctions would 
m  all probability be the harbingers of economic and social
instability which would put at risk the government of the day In
short the potential costs are simply not worth the potential
gains from weaponization Either country would have to feel
acutely threatened to exercise the nuclear option Since nuclear 
deterrence already exists this is not likely to happen
Would missile deployment by both under the present condition of 
nonweaponzed deterrence have a destabilizing effect7 For those 
schooled m  the American tradition of strategic thought yes it 
would raise tensions sharply and bring about weaponization And 
since India and Pakistan are physically juxtaposed the mutual 
threat would m  this view impel them to adopt hair-trigger 
launch-on-warning postures thereby increasing the probability of 
accidental war Moreover because both would have small arsenals 
they would lean toward preemptive strategies m  order to counter 
the vulnerability of their own weapons to surprise attack The 
problem here is that American strategic thought tends to view the 
role and effects of nuclear weapons from one side only If the 
potential target of a surprise attack is not sure whether its 
weapons will survive it is also true that the attacker is at 
least as unsure how effective a first strike will be and how many 
of the target s weapons will remain unscathed Second-strike 
capability has to be viewed from the attacker s perspective since 
by definition it is the attacker who must make the decision to 
begin a conflict In the strategic relationship between India and 
Pakistan neither can be certain of wiping out all or even most of 
the other s arsenal Even a small retaliation can inflict 
horrendous damage which is clear to both countries which means 
both will be deterred from contemplating preemption For basically 
the same reason launch-on-warning strategies are not inevitable 
If both sides know the other has second-strike capability it is 
equally viable (and safer) to have wait-and-respond strategies 
These can be strengthened by confidence-building measures on 
deployment and communication
Scenarios of doom distort the essential nature of the India- 
Pakistan nuclear relationship which has a distinct rhythm and 
pace of its own that is far removed from the Cold War US-Soviet 
relationship Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
developed nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrine m  the context of 
their experience of the Second World War an all-consuming total 
war m  which conventional weapons rained immense destruction
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causing enormous fatalities--300,000 died in Dresden in twenty- 
four hours. Their nuclear arsenals were designed accordingly and 
the strategic arms race betwen them proceeded at a swift pace 
dictated by their global competition. As such, notwithstanding 
the current nostalgia of many cold warriors for the "stability" of 
the Cold War era, the superpowers were engaged in periodic 
confrontation, though they learned to be cautious after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.
South Asia's nuclear programs have been of an entirely different 
nature. Thinking about nuclear weapons has not been shaped by the 
experience of military conflict of any great magnitude. On the 
contrary, all the three wars between India and Pakistan have been 
of short duration, with relatively little loss of life. Where 
nuclear weapons are concerned, the overall dynamic of strategic 
relations has been one of restraint. Because of their own 
technical limitations, resource constraints and external controls, 
India and Pakistan have nuclearized very slowly. Besides, they 
have learned from the superpower experience that a nuclear arms 
race, which is qualitatively different from a conventional one, 
brings more costs and risks than security gains. In contrast with 
the unbridled US-Soviet competition, which tended to revolve 
around the question "how much more do we need for effective 
deterrence?", the India-Pakistan relationship is concerned with 
"how litle is sufficient?" If South Asia does go nuclear, there is 
every reason to believe that its nuclear dynamics will be 
characterized by prudence and pragmatism rather than a headlong 
rush toward disaster.
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